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Victims as moral beacons of humanitarianism in post-conflict societies  
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper reports on interview data amongst victims of conflict and organised violence. 
Despite their victimhood, they evince a level of forgivingness, civility and tolerance that 
constructs in the very acts of atrocity that portend its demise, a form of humanitarianism 
which enables victims to be moral beacons in post-conflict societies that otherwise are largely 
devoid of any a moral or sacred canopy. Data cover victims in Sri Lanka, South Africa and 
Northern Ireland. The theoretical contribution of the paper is to proffer a view that 
humanitarianism in societies emerging out of conflict is best understood as a social practice 
constituted by victims’ practices for tolerance and civility.  This makes humanitarianism pro-
social, having the potential to affect social consciousness and social understandings in post-
conflict societies and to assist in the remaking of society after conflict. 
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Introduction 
This paper reports on interview data with victims of conflict in three post-conflict societies. 
The data offer a special route into discussing the nature of modern humanitarianism. Victims 
are people who might be expected to find humanitarian sensibilities difficult to practice as a 
result of their experience of the worst levels of atrocity; yet many are more capable than most 
to be moral beacons in their practice of humanitarian virtues. The forms of atrocity victims 
experience in modern warfare are deeply moral but it is not an over-arching framework of 
moral values that turns many victims into moral beacons. If it were, the moral landscape of 
post-conflict societies would be more uniformly humanitarian and compassionate.  The 
research question which motivates this paper is therefore how best we can understand the 
source of the humanitarian virtues many victims display after conflict. We argue that the 
priority placed by some victims on justice, human dignity and emotional empathy for all 
victims after conflict constructs humanitarianism as a social process, such that, where it is 
found, it resides in the social practices of victims themselves rather than an over-arching 
moral framework of humanitarian sensibility.  
Two implications of this approach are worth highlighting. First, the voices of victims, 
whenever they are captured in the modern literature on humanitarianism tend to be heard only 
in terms of how victims relate to professional aid workers and in terms of the specific (and 
usually failed) humanitarian intervention. By contrast, we capture the voices of victims 
directly, particularly for how they understand their victimhood and its implications for their 
relationship with the ‘other’. This paper therefore advances an approach to humanitarianism 
that is more squarely victim-centred than current literature. Secondly, contrary to Fassin’s 
claim that humanitarian interventions destroy social sensibilities (Fassin, 2012), we argue that 
victims’ social practice of humanitarianism restores humanitarianism as one of the most 
important sources of sociability and social understanding in post-conflict societies. This paper 
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therefore propounds the view that a victim-centred humanitarianism makes humanitarianism 
localised and vernacular, grounded in the social practises of victims themselves in their 
specific social context,  but also profoundly social at the same time. A victim-centred 
approach allows us to return to humanitarianism as a source of social renewal.  
The paper will proceed in four stages. First we will highlight the ‘moral turn’ in 
conceptualisations of modern humanitarianism in order to show the way in which modern 
humanitarianism is understood. Secondly we discuss the nature of the moral landscape in 
post-conflict societies in order to show how inappropriate these kinds of society are to the 
‘moral turn’ in the conceptualisation of modern humanitarianism. Thirdly we outline our own 
approach to humanitarianism as a social practice grounded in the practices of victims 
themselves. Fourthly, we illustrate this approach with interview data with victims in Northern 
Ireland, South Africa and Sri Lanka.  
 
The ‘moral turn’ in understanding humanitarianism  
Three features mark debates about modern humanitarianism. The first is an emphasis on 
humanitarianism as an over-arching moral framework of sensibilities, ethics and reason; the 
second is a focus on the international and civil institutions and agencies that outwork this 
ethical framework; the third is a sense that humanitarianism is in crisis.  
While Barnett and Weiss (2008) recognise there are contested humanitarianisms, they 
show that humanitarianism in its current phase has been both institutionalised and 
internationalised, represented as it is in international agencies and global civil society groups 
that concern themselves with aid and relief, as well as with wider issues of peacebuilding, 
democratisation and economic development.  The sense that humanitarianism is in crisis (on 
which see in particular Rieff, 2002) comes as a result of its very institutionalisation and 
internationalisation, for a damaging critique has emerged of the way in which these agencies 
5 
 
and civil society groups protect the bureaucratic interests of the UN that employs them 
(Barnett 2011), serve the interests of the privileged (Calhoun, 2004), and get exploited to 
legitimise the hegemony of Western models of political and economic governance that 
perpetuate global inequalities and injustices (Fassin, 2005); to the point where Fassin (2012), 
perhaps the most vociferous critic of modern humanitarianism, argues that these agencies 
distort indigenous social understandings by facilitating new forms of social domination.  
This article restricts itself to the first of these debates and argues that there has been a 
‘moral turn’ in the way we conceptualise humanitarianism. This ‘moral turn’ forms the 
theoretical backdrop to our paper and constitutes the literature with which it engages. Very 
like human rights debates in the 1970s (Moyn, 2011: 3), there is now an appeal to morality in 
discussions of modern humanitarianism, which parallels what others have called the ‘cultural 
turn’ in social science generally (Rojek and Turner, 2000). By this we mean that 
humanitarianism is widely understood as a moral sensibility, describing ethical virtues of 
benevolence, kindness and emotional empathy towards fellow human beings; virtues which 
are themselves located within a broader ethical framework that functions as a moral or sacred 
canopy affecting the values of those living beneath the canopy. The word sacred in this sense 
refers to the transcendent qualities of the over-arching values rather than that they are 
religious. Ethical virtues such as these are certainly not restricted to religious systems of 
belief, let alone Christianity. Indeed, the close association between religion and conflict has 
often witnessed religion as the source of some of the worst humanitarian abuses in history. 
The ethical frameworks that predispose these virtues are of many sorts.   
The idea that humanitarianism is an over-arching moral framework of virtues is 
reflected in references to a ‘humanitarian sensibility’ in late modernity (Simms and Trim, 
2011), or to there being a general ‘humanitarian reason’, ‘humanitarian ethic’ or 
‘humanitarian morality’. Didier Fassin (2012), for example, entitles his analysis 
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Humanitarian Reason, seeing his study as ‘a moral history of the present’. These terms 
generate further references to there being a ‘culture of compassion’ (Barnett, 2011), a ‘global 
moral community’ (Fassin, 2012), embedded in humanitarianism as a moral canopy. Fassin, 
(2012), for example, sees humanitarianism as based on a global moral community embedded 
in universal humanity, in which all lives are equal, arguing that the earlier language of rights 
and justice that infused humanitarianism has been replaced with a moral and ethical concern 
with suffering and compassion. This sort of ethical and moral language is replete in many 
modern studies of humanitarianism. Fassin’s French compatriot, the sociologist Luc 
Boltanski (1999), for example, reinforces this ‘moral turn’ in humanitarianism studies when 
he refers to the growth of cosmopolitan humanitarianism that encourages an emotional 
empathy with the ‘distant suffering’ of the marginalised and strange other, which is consistent 
with what Barnett (2011: 8), in his comprehensive history of humanitarianism, calls the 
‘expanding international ethics of care’.  
We are not here disputing the existence or importance of moral virtues like 
compassion, tolerance, civility, benevolence and the like, nor are we contesting that they 
constitute the very bedrock of humanitarian sensibilities. This paper critically engages with 
the ‘moral turn’ in modern humanitarianism in two ways. First, we argue that we need to 
better theorise how these moral virtues work in practice. We claim that they do not work in 
simplistic ways as if forming a sacred canopy whose moral precepts envelope all those living 
beneath it and inculcates ethical humanitarian virtues to people uniformly. We suggest that 
humanitarianism should instead be theorised as a social practice grounded in and affected by 
conditions within culture, the market and the state. By so doing, we are able to see moral 
virtues like compassion, tolerance and civility as embedded in the social practices and 
behaviours of people themselves, some of whom are not capable of practising humanitarian 
sensibilities.  
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Secondly, by illustrating these theoretical claims with research data from victims of 
conflict, we offer a victim-centred approach to humanitarianism that contrasts fundamentally 
with the existing humanitarianism studies literature on victims, which portrays them as 
passive, subjected to and dependent on the care and activities of aid agencies rather than as 
agents capable of transforming their own moral landscape.  Despair, hopelessness and 
emotional dependency are very real amongst victims of conflict, but some victims have 
agency sufficient enough to become ‘moral beacons’ (a phrase borrowed from Thomas, 
1999) in their capacity to practice moral virtues like civility, tolerance and compassion as the 
foundation to a victim-centred humanitarianism. What we need to understand therefore, are 
the conditions under which some victims can and others cannot practice these virtues. 
In his account of human rights, Moyn (2010, 2011), drew a useful distinction between 
human rights as they are talked about in the public sphere, and the practice of human rights 
by activists themselves. This led him to emphasise the importance of the vernacularisation of 
human rights, the way in which they are rendered into local idioms by activists themselves on 
the ground (Moyn, 2011: 136). We suggest that this finds a parallel in the way 
humanitarianism should be conceptualised. The focus should be on how humanitarianism is 
practised by victims and rendered into idioms that differ remarkably from the way 
humanitarianism is conceptualised by professionals in the modern literature.  
In what follows, we explore this view of humanitarianism with respect to the social 
practices of one specific social category of people, victims of communal conflicts and 
organised violence, and in only certain social spaces, societies emerging out of conflict. 
Despite the harrowing victimhood experiences to which they were exposed, some victims’ 
social practices after conflict nonetheless evince a level of forgivingness, civility and 
tolerance that constructs after the very acts of atrocity that portend its demise, a form of 
humanitarianism that enables some victims to be moral beacons in post-conflict societies. 
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To develop this analysis, it is necessary next to demonstrate that post-conflict 
societies are largely devoid of, or struggle to express, humanitarian sensibilities. This means 
that the moral virtues that define modern humanitarianism and which are practised in post-
conflict societies by only some people cannot be located in or understood as caused by a new 
over-arching compassionate and benevolent moral framework.  
 
The moral vacuum in post-conflict societies 
There is no sacred canopy of moral virtues to generate humanitarianism in post-conflict 
societies; societies emerging out of conflict largely experience a moral vacuum.  It is ironic 
that organised violence and communal conflict in late modernity is deeply moral by nature 
but that its cessation does not end up in peace processes that create a new moral and sacred 
canopy by which those living beneath it can practice humanitarian virtues like benevolence, 
kindness and emotional empathy toward their erstwhile enemy.  Peace processes are fragile 
(Brewer, 2010) and the threat of renewed outbreaks of violence is ever present (Darby, 2001), 
at least in the medium term.  The legacy of the conflict lives on in polarised communities, 
mistrust, and in difficulties in learning to live together. It is for this reason, for example, that 
Graham (2016) argues that social capital theory, which normally encapsulates the processes 
through which ethical virtues are socially disseminated, is not well suited to divided societies. 
However, the moral nature of this conflict serves to intensify the levels of atrocity and thus 
the scale of abuse that constitutes the victimhood experience. In the moral vacuum that exists 
in post-conflict societies, victims thus often have to create their own humanitarian renewal. 
 An account of this irony is worth giving as context to the empirical data in order to 
better appreciate that respondents’ victimhood experiences are the very medium through 
which they can construct their own ethical practices.   
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 The moral nature of contemporary organised violence is reflected well in the 
description of it as representing a new kind of war (Kaldor, 1999). In new wars two key 
boundary markers disappear by which innocent civilians were formerly protected from 
purposeful harm (rather than collateral damage). In new wars the distinction between 
combatant and non-combatant disappears, making civilians purposely targets; and there is no 
longer a set battlefield, resulting in civilian areas being turned into war zones. Attacking 
civilians, after all, is the main point of most forms of organised violence. Moreover, in new 
wars the human body itself has become a battlefield, particularly women’s bodies (see Hynes, 
2004). Degradations of the human body, with gross levels of atrocity perpetrated on it, reflect 
the moral enervation of one’s enemy, in which the enemy is no longer recognised or treated 
as a moral being. This has witnessed the return of de-technological forms of violence, in 
which the machete and sword are the preferred weapons of degradation; and beheadings and 
body mutilations the choice of attack. Even cannibalism has been known to occur in some 
communal conflicts. It is only by stripping one’s enemy of moral value and denying them 
human dignity as moral agents that this level of barbarity can be perpetrated – even boasted 
of. New wars are thus not only highly sophisticated as technological weapons of destruction 
become readily available on the black market; they are simultaneously de-technological, as 
moral enervation permits atrocities being carried out in face-to-face human encounters of the 
most vicious kind and not just by drones hundreds of miles in the sky from vantage points 
oceans away. It is processes like these that make contemporary conflicts inherently moral 
irrespective of their political cause.  
Respect for the other’s human dignity is not easily restored after this level of moral 
enervation. Rather than a new moral and sacred canopy that reshapes the moral landscape in 
societies emerging out of conflict, the relative decline in levels of violence gets turned into 
contestation over the morality of the conflict, whether or not it was justified, for what 
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purpose, and whether its legacy makes it worth it. With the political arrangements in the 
peace process bedding in, even if not wholly successful, contestation can get focused on the 
morality of the past violence.  Post-conflict societies therefore tend to experience a 
downwardly spiralling cycle of moral recalibration that is both counter-productive to the 
development of a new moral and sacred canopy that might reshape their moral landscape. 
Moral recalibration is evident in selective moral condemnation of the past in at least 
three ways. The first, is the use of a victim hierarchy in which one’s own community is said 
to have suffered the most, with the ‘other’ community’s behaviour being the more heinous; 
secondly, in the use of blaming strategies in which the ‘other community’ is always the one 
with the primary responsibility for the conflict and for any abrogation of the peace; and 
thirdly, in the avoidance of acknowledgement by which people and organisations reflect on 
their own acts of commission or acts of omission, during both the conflict and the peace.  
Moral recalibration leads to fruitless debates about who killed more, who suffered more, and 
who was the more heinous. No worse measure of the moral vacuum that can exist in post-
conflicts societies is found than to engage in a bloody headcount of who killed the least – or 
the most (Brewer, 2015).  
In using selective moral condemnation, people are, of course, locating the various 
problems arising from the legacy of the conflict within different and competing moral 
frameworks. The moral vacuum they experience is not so much an absence of values but a 
failure to establish a new moral framework that might facilitate humanitarianism. For a long 
time after the ending of conflict, these kinds of society tend to have no shared peace vocation, 
no shared moral vision as to what peace means and what it might deliver in the future, and no 
common value orientation promoted by any shared commitment to humanitarianism.  In the 
medium term, post-conflict societies tend to suffer the same polarised moral frameworks they 
always had and which helped to shape the conflict in the first place. Therefore they lack an 
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over-arching moral framework that might serve as a moral or sacred canopy to furnish the 
values in which humanitarian sensibilities can embed. 
This impacts on how we must understand humanitarianism in post-conflict societies. 
Humanitarianism cannot be viewed solely as a set of moral precepts towards other human 
beings that nestles beneath a sacred canopy or over-arching framework of values that 
reshapes people’s beliefs and behaviour after conflict.  No such value system exists in 
societies emerging out of conflict. As the following two sections argue, humanitarian 
consideration towards erstwhile enemies resides in the social practices many victims engage 
in as they search for justice, human dignity and emotional empathy for all victims across the 
communal divide.  
 
Understanding humanitarianism as a social practice 
The term social practice is not used loosely. It is a meeting point for philosophy and the 
social sciences and has a technical meaning. Tuomela’s (2002) philosophy of social practices, 
describes social practices as the specific mental states of agents that are orientated towards 
collective attitudes and social interests, and as such are the building blocks of inter-
subjectivity and eventually of habit, custom and tradition in society. More broadly, in 
sociology the term social practice is treated almost as an equivalent to social action, 
describing forms of relationships, activities and discursive strategies that are normative. 
Normative is meant in both its sociological senses: something that is based on norms (that is, 
grounded in actual values, beliefs and behaviours) and is also socially desirable (that is, it has 
virtue attached to it as an ideal). Sociologically, therefore, social practices constitute the 
norms, values, habits and behaviours that describe the regular patterns of social life (the way 
of living together and talking to one another as practised in society) and the aspirational 
ideals on which social life ought to be lived (the virtuous way to practise living together and 
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talking to one another in society).  In sociology, social practices are not rendered as certain 
forms of mental state, but as forms of social relationships that reproduce society, either as it is 
mundanely practised (made into the norm) or idealised into something better (made 
normative). 
In this definition, humanitarianism in post-conflict societies is a social practice that 
involves believing in and performing the ritualised behaviours and forms of talk that enact 
ethical virtues like kindness, benevolence and emotional empathy towards former 
protagonists in the public sphere, which end up promoting tolerance and civility. 
Humanitarianism is both a norm (capable of being practised) and normative (virtuous as an 
ideal).  
While humanitarianism amongst victims after conflict works through civility and 
tolerance it is different from them. There is a long-established philosophical debate about 
civility and toleration in which toleration is rendered as discrete practices within the public 
sphere that assists democratic dialogue (O’Neill, 1993) and in which civility is portrayed as 
the exercise of tolerance in the face of deep disagreement (Calhoun, 2000: 256). Social order 
and political stability in deeply divided societies is recognised in Rawls’s notion of justice as 
depending on the practice of toleration (1996: 10). However, while humanitarianism is 
outworked through civility and tolerance in our approach it is not equivalent to them. For 
victims of conflict, civility and tolerance are premised first on the ability to practice ethical 
virtues, and only by this practice are civility and tolerance possible. Civility and tolerance are 
thus the outcome of the practice of humanitarian ethical virtues, not their cause.  A social 
practice approach to humanitarianism is thus less concerned with clarifying the meaning of 
civility and tolerance than in specifying the conditions under which the practice of ethical 
virtues by victims allows them to flourish or not.  These are the sorts of issues we develop 
further in the next section. 
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Victims as moral beacons 
At this juncture it is necessary to give some detail of the research project from which this data 
is drawn. The data come from a 6-year Leverhulme Trust-funded project entitled 
‘Compromise after Conflict’ (see http://www.compromiseafterconflict.org) that focused on 
the development of compromise amongst victims of conflict in Northern Ireland, South 
Africa and Sri Lanka. These three societies were deliberately chosen because they represent 
different kinds of peace process: Sri Lanka a victor’s peace involving a military defeat for 
one side; South Arica the colonial model of elite change at the top with little changing at the 
bottom; and Northern Ireland, the classical mutually-agreed second-preference negotiated 
political settlement in which parties give up on their first preference. This choice allowed us 
to establish whether the type of peace impacts on victims’ capacity for compromise. The 
project ended in 2015.  
We conducted sample surveys in all three countries and in-depth qualitative 
interviews. The interviews, which are reported on here, were conducted with a cross section 
of victims, garnered through victim support groups, personal contacts and the snowball 
technique. Interviewees thus do not represent statistical national samples, as with our 
quantitative research, but are what is commonly called purposive or judgemental samples, 
where people are approached according to their fit with the theoretical ideas of the research; 
in this case that they had experienced conflict-related harm and that they represented one or 
more of the groups involved in the conflict in each society. Over the period 2011-14, in all 60 
victims were interviewed from across Northern Ireland, 80 across Sri Lanka and 51 across 
South Africa.  Interviews in Sri Lanka were conducted by our research partner in indigenous 
languages and the translations back into English checked by fluent speakers. A standard 
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interview schedule appropriately acculturated was used in all three cases to ensure 
comparability of the data. 
Empirically we defined victims as those who have experienced conflict-related harm. 
Harm was understood in its broadest sense to cover medical, emotional, relational, and 
cultural hurts. Hurts can be real or imagined. They can also be direct (to the individuals 
themselves and their immediate family), indirect (to others whom they know personally), or 
collective (to whole social groups). Where group membership is important to the individual 
victim’s sense of identity, people will experience harm to the group(s) with which they 
identify and develop a sense of groups as victims. This is different from ‘collective hurts’, 
since this term describes the scale of the experience (that it affected everyone).  To describe 
groups as victims encapsulates that individual victims feel they belong to particular groups 
that suffered specific harm.  
If victims are defined by the experience of harm, ‘victimhood’ is different. It is the 
process initiated by the (real or imagined) experience of harm and describes the course over 
time that the harm and its consequences take and the procedures by which they are managed. 
Victimhood is a developmental process, involving change in how the experience is packaged 
and handled over time (captured in the phrase that victims ‘move on’) and varies with time 
according to all sorts of cognitive, relational, political, social and cultural factors. 
Developmental processes, however, do not necessarily go only in the forward direction; 
‘moving on’ is matched, in colloquial terms, by ‘hanging on’ or ‘going back’.  Clearly not all 
victims experience the conditions that facilitate benevolence, kindness and emotional 
empathy. To understand humanitarianism in such societies therefore we need to locate it in 
the social practices of those victims who reproduce it.   
 This point bears repeating so we are not misunderstood. Interviewees in our samples 
were not all able to practice humanitarian virtues. What is necessary therefore is to 
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understand the conditions under which some can and others cannot practise humanitarian 
virtues. This is precisely the importance of a victim-centred approach to humanitarianism that 
locates it in victims’ social practices, for these practices vary, such that some are incapable of 
practising benevolence and compassion to erstwhile enemies. It is necessary to understand 
the conditions that lead to this differentiation.  
 Social practices lie in behaviour learned over time and can sometimes be unintended 
consequences of other behaviours, relationships and social networks. Very many victims 
talked of the benefits of social networks that included members of the ‘other’ community 
through which they learned trust, understanding and empathy. As a Northern Irish Protestant 
said referring to his social network of other victims, ‘we have gone cross community, which I 
would not have done. This group has brought me to this stage, it is not the government; it is 
my own understanding, because I do not want my grandchildren to go through what my 
children went through’. Other Protestants from this formerly dominant group said much the 
same: ‘we became involved in this cross border project, it was brilliant. We were able to go 
down and we met women from down the South of Ireland and you listened to their stories. So 
I think the more you hear from other people, as well as relate to them, and you can see they 
are just like us. People can set aside their differences then’. ‘We have been away on many 
residentials with Catholic groups and there are people you’d think you knew all your life. We 
stand as one big group’.  Victims who lack these cross-communal social networks are the 
ones less capable of practising humanitarian virtues. 
It is not surprising that Northern Irish victims are most likely to express benevolent 
views because cross community engagement is more advanced in their peace process, for the 
constraints of geography in Sri Lanka’s case and the enduring legacy of group areas left over 
from apartheid limit the possibilities there, but a Black South African said much the same of 
his experience in a multi-racial support group: ‘something will come up and it will trigger the 
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memories of a night, or being in a cell, of what was said [but] we still share our experiences 
amongst each other and that it important, it keeps the friendship’. Other Black South African 
victims explained from where they learned these social practices.  ‘When I got to [Robben] 
Island I was an ill-disciplined man and the elderly comrades took me under their wings and 
started to teach me. So there you learnt that it is not about yourself, it is about taking your 
country forward.’ 
 However, it is not just cross-communal social networks that encourage humanitarian 
social practices. Another social practice is an emotional empathy with the erstwhile enemy. 
This empathy reflects itself in many ways. Sometimes it is outworked in the realisation that 
the subordinate and powerless ‘other’ suffered as much, if not more, than those in the 
dominant group they were fighting against. Many Sinhalese victims in Sri Lanka expressed 
this. ‘I think more than ourselves, the Tamils were miserable. Seeing things like this I cried. I 
saw much of this misery.’ ‘In the last days of the war, the Tamils suffered a great deal. When 
I saw this tears came to my eyes. Those people (Tamils) had nothing. I know they were 
indeed miserable.’ Sometimes this realisation comes from meeting the other after conflict for 
the first time. As a Sinhalese victims said, ‘when we spoke to them, we found that they had 
suffered more than we did’. The same happened in Northern Ireland. ‘I have moved on, we 
have friends now who are Catholics and we get on very well with them. You empathise with 
them and you sort of understand what they went through, and that gives you a bond. 
Everybody bleeds the same and everybody hurts the same’ (Northern Irish Protestant). ‘Well, 
I go and do courses with Catholic people. They have been through the same thing. They are 
just ordinary people like me; they went through the same things, maybe worse. And I can 
empathise with that. I would turn round and say I am sorry’ (Northern Irish Protestant). 
 Sometimes empathy is evidenced in victims wishing to deny any side won and that all 
sides lost as a result of the violence. ‘All are losers, no winners, both parties lost miserably’ 
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(Sri Lankan Tamil); ‘There is nothing like winners and losers. Even the Tamils have not lost. 
We have not lost. We have not won.’ (Sri Lankan Sinhalese); ‘We are one country, we are 
one nation and people; division is a loss for both parties’ (Sri Lankan Tamil); ‘We cannot 
make a distinction between winners and losers. Speaking as human beings, it was humanness 
that was lost. All suffered a lot of harm. No one has won or lost. In fact all have lost.’ (Sri 
Lankan Sinhalese); The reference to ‘humanness’ by this relatively poor and uneducated 
Sinhala comes nearest to putting into words what humanitarian sensibility means to them. 
 Empathy is also outworked in new revelations and social understandings that some 
victims develop, such as the realisation that victimhood is a shared experience and that 
victims should treat each other the same as a result. ‘They speak of a mother whose husband 
was shot dead by the army in some Tamil village. She cries of the death of her husband. They 
do not treat us [as an army widow] differently’ (Sri Lankan Sinhalese); ‘If you take the actual 
[Sri Lankan] soldiers and Tamil militants, both these groups have been duped, thus there is 
some equality between the two. Living in a situation of misery, both the LTTE militants and 
the Sri Lankan soldiers were dragged into war. In that respect poverty is the same for both the 
north and the south’ (Sri Lankan Tamil); ‘I have learnt that there are two sides to a story. 
Before, it was they are wrong, we are right, end of story’ (Northern Irish Protestant). As a 
Sinhalese victim said, ‘the Sinhalese and Tamils are two groups. The Sinhalese cannot be 
treated better than the Tamils. If both are treated equally then the peace process will 
continue’. 
 Another new revelation arsing from empathy is respect for the erstwhile enemy. This 
respect is another differentiating condition that separates victims’ social practices. ‘I think the 
change for me’, said a Northern Irish Catholic, is ‘just respect for other people’. From respect 
comes the narrowing of differences. ‘I think I can [consider reconciliation]. Peace has 
dawned.  Now people are not so polarised as earlier’ (Sri Lankan Sinhalese). As a Northern 
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Irish Protestant said, ‘we live that close there is only a wall and a road between us but you 
still wouldn’t bother with the other side. Now it is different’. Empathy is also about working 
together to deal with differences, since these differences do not suddenly disappear. As a 
Northern Irish Catholic said, ‘I hope we can all work together. If we can get down to the 
reality, the basics, food, water, light, heat, we could talk about those’. Given that empathy can 
affect new social understandings and new patterns of behaviour toward the other, there is a 
sense that all victims deserve recognition without fear or favour. As one Northern Irish 
Protestant put it succinctly, it is a question of ‘justice and peace for all the victims’.  
This is often easier said than done, for patterns of power and inequality very rarely 
change with peace processes, such that social transformation does not often accompany 
conflict transformation (for the distinction see Brewer, Higgins and Teeney, 2011). As a 
Sinhalese victim noted in Sri Lanka, ‘it is going to be a tough task for the oncoming 
generations in terms of justice, fairness in all aspect of their lives’. Many Black South 
African victims spoke of their disappointment that socio-economic redistribution had not 
accompanied non-racial democratisation and many recognised the continuance of economic 
apartheid. Sri Lanka’s victor’s peace imposes different burdens on the victorious and the 
vanquished.  With the military defeat of the LTTE and the feelings of loss amongst Tamils, 
Sinhalese need to recognise the added issues involved in Tamil victimhood, and Tamils have 
very strong feelings of powerlessness and loss to overcome. Social structural constraints 
operate in post-conflict societies that add to the difficulties of victims in practising empathy, 
forgiveness and tolerance.  
 Nonetheless, despite the obvious and real perception of the likelihood of continued 
inequality in the short to medium term, many victims expressed a remarkable capacity for 
forgiveness. As a Black South African said, ‘I didn’t regard a white person as a person. I 
regard[ed] him as a person to be killed. After that I had to go into exile [and] I was trained as 
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a soldier, a freedom fighter, though now I am relieved. I had to forgive and love the people. 
Although the scars are there, I have forgiven.’ ‘You have to learn to forgive or you won’t 
move on’ (Northern Irish Protestant); ‘We do not have much of an animosity towards them. 
Now we have got peace. I do not have any ill-feeling towards the Tamils even though I lost 
my father’ (Sri Lankan Sinhalese); ‘We can live without fear and doubt’ (Tamil). ‘We as 
black people, we have forgiven white people, already we have forgiven them. And what we 
need now from them is to embrace us [as] equal’ (Black South African). ‘We forgive them all 
for the wrongs they did to us’ (Black South African). 
 Sometimes this capacity for magnanimity and forgiveness was altruistic, recognised 
as something that was needed as a lesson if others were to move on. ‘I think we need to move 
on and start trying to build the country for the kids’ (Northern Irish Protestant); ‘[South 
Africa] reached a political solution in the interest of the greater good’ (Black South African).  
In some other victims mangnanmity was motivated by self-interest, residing in the realisation 
it was essential if they as an individual victim were to move on and progress. As a Northern 
Irish Catholic said, ‘you can’t let it [victimhood] drag them down. They have to move on. 
Obviously you can’t forget about loved ones and some of the atrocities, but you do have to 
move on’. This was echoed by a Protestant counterpart. ‘Yes, there are some people who live 
in the past, and I feel sorry for them really. But they have a different make up to me. And 
while I don’t forget the past, I can also share and want to move into the future.’ A Black 
South African victim expressed a similar view in this way: ‘Of course, there are instances 
when you remember things in the past but, of course, one tries hard not to dwell on that, 
because dwelling on that really keeps back one’s progress in life.’  
 Whatever its motivation, one of the consequences of the ambition to move on was 
hope for the future. Regardless of the social structural travails victims find themselves in, 
especially victims under a victor’s peace and those who have experienced little socio-
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economic redistribution, many victims could state: ‘I still feel hopeful because I think it is a 
slow process and I still think that eventually we will get to the stage where people can really 
live together’ (Black South African); ‘Your period in prison is a learning curve because in 
prison you meet all these ANC leaders, so they equipped you, those very senior ANC cadres 
actually teach you hope’ (Black South African); ‘I don’t want my grandchildren going 
through all this again’ (Northern Irish Protestant). 
 Another of the consequences of these victims’ new social understanding was the 
practice of tolerance. Many victims recognised the public practice of tolerance as crucial to 
the construction of a new society even when in private tolerance is not what is felt or 
experienced, and even when in public such tolerance is difficult to maintain.  ‘The issue of 
tolerance toward those who violated us is a true fact because in public it is expected from us 
to project the idea of a good patriot that needs to walk in the footsteps of Mandela, the great 
reconciler and for the sake of nation building’ (Black South African). ‘At times you have to 
display tolerance and exercise control even toward previous oppressors. And that is coupled 
with assessing your behaviour and utterances in public space’ (Black South African). ‘It 
[tolerance] is a journey we need to undertake. It is going to be “give and take along the way” 
and we will need to negotiate’ (Black South African).  
There was even recognition in some victims that tolerance is the outcome of victim’s 
social practices rather than the cause. As we argued earlier when outlining our social practice 
approach to humanitarianism, for victims of conflict civility and tolerance are premised first 
on the ability to practice ethical virtues, and only by this practice are civility and tolerance 
possible. Civility and tolerance are thus the outcome of the practice of humanitarian ethical 
virtues, not their cause.  A Northern Irish Protestant expressed this clearly and with great 
insight. ‘I feel that tolerance comes after reconciliation. Some people may say it comes 
before, but I feel it comes after. Because the fact is, we go and meet people from different 
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communities, we have youth groups, cross community as well, and after a wee while, people 
realise they are not so much different.’  
 We repeat, however, that no one should be Panglossian, for the ambivalence of the 
victimhood experience carries forward into the social practice of humanitarianism in post-
conflict societies. For all this capacity for victims to be moral beacons, there is nothing in our 
conceptualisation that suggests that the public practice of humanitarian ethical virtues is an 
easy thing for victims to do. As one Black South African victim said, ‘I physically survived 
[but] people can still remain trapped in moments of history’. Their social practices do not 
necessarily leave victims happy, with new ‘rainbow nation’ identities, able easily to love 
erstwhile enemies, readily willing to turn the other cheek and with a sense of wholeness and 
completeness in their relations with former protagonists. In her discussion of political 
widowhood in South Africa, Ramphele (1997), the widow of the murdered Steve Biko, 
argues that such an elevated public status can also be a personal burden and a form of social 
entrapment, and is fraught with ambiguities (1997: 102). These include the sense that the 
political widow is publicly owned and open to political exploitation (1997: 110).  Our data 
show that civility and tolerance come at a cost, and feelings of grief and loss are slow to 
dissipate. Feelings of retreat co-exist in victims with reconciliation; wholeness and 
brokenness exists side-by-side in degrees of disharmony. Life for victims is a ‘just tolerable 
discomfort’, as the poet and classicist AE Housman once described his own life, in which 
victims oscillate between remembrance and forgetting, reconciliation and retreat, despair and 
elation, and wholeness and brokenness. In interviews, victims reflected on this disharmony 
within themselves, and told of the circumstances in which they found it difficult to maintain 
the public practice of civility and tolerance. The conditions under which humanitarianism can 
be garnered and sustained, which facilitate or constrain public civility and tolerance, therefore 
need summation and clarification.  
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Victims’ capacity for practising humanitarianism is affected, for example, by whether 
or not a ‘victim identity’ has emerged which restricts victims’ social networks in ways that 
inhibit the practice of the ethical virtues that constitute humanitarianism.  In these cases the 
victim experience becomes, in Max Weber’s terms, the ‘master status’, the central defining 
identity marker. Victims (individuals or groups) develop ‘victim identity’, therefore, when 
the victim experience consumes all other identity markers and is used as the ‘mental map’ to 
explain life’s subsequent fates. The development of a victim identity seriously impacts the 
social connectedness of victims, evident in social withdrawal (lack of connectedness) or 
participation in restricted social networks with similar others (partisan connectedness), such 
as with own-group members or within their small victim support group. It was for this reason 
that many of our interviewees without such a victim identity preferred to see themselves as 
‘survivors’ not ‘victims’.  Practising humanitarian virtues is near impossible for them. 
Even for those with a survivor identity, however, our empirical data suggest that 
humanitarianism is envisaged as being easier for people to practice publicly according to 
several mediating factors. These following conditions are not comprehensive and more can 
be imagined. They are often personal and manifold, but amongst them are included, for 
example, feelings of hope, trust, the capacity for forgiveness, the ability to transcend divided 
memories of the former conflict, senses of the fairness of the concessions, views about 
whether in practice the concessions remain reciprocal, and participation in open and inclusive 
the social networks that transcend ancient divides, such as mixing with victims from the 
‘other’ community under the impulse that they share a common victimhood. These mediating 
conditions help explain the ambivalent, bitter-sweet nature of humanitarian social practices 
for victims of conflict and why some victims find them difficult or impossible to practice.   
We contend, therefore, that a victim-centred approach is necessary if we are to 
understand the conditions that facilitate the practice of humanitarian in post-conflict societies. 
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With such a victim-centred approach, victims are able to reflect on this disharmony within 
themselves and to examine the conditions under which their practice of these humanitarian 
virtues in the public sphere is reproduced or breaks down. For as one Black South African 
victim said, ‘people ask victims, “have you forgiven the perpetrator”, to me it waxes and 
wanes’.   
 
Conclusion 
Victims of conflict are usually voiceless, made even more so in peace processes that often 
portrays them as an obstacle to progress. Morris (1997: 27) refers to this as the ‘silence of 
suffering’ and it is reflected well in the following extract from our interview with a Black 
South Africa: ‘there is no platform for us to speak, how we felt, what we went through, 
because people are saying today “apartheid was here, it’s gone” and “don’t speak about 
apartheid because it’s gone”. For us to speak out, that is important to us.’ In taking a victim-
centred approach that captures victims’ voices directly, this paper has argued for a victim-
centred approach to understanding humanitarianism in post-conflict societies, which locates 
the ethical virtues that mark humanitarianism in the social practices of victims themselves as 
they search of dignity and justice for all victims regardless of past conflicts and despite 
enduring social cleavages.  
These social practices are not easily performed and are not without significant 
ambiguities and difficulties. Our data show that only some victims create their own 
humanitarian renewal. Victims can sometimes feel emotionally repressed, under an obligation 
to be tolerant and civil, and unable to express the resentment, hate and revenge that 
sometimes exists within them. A Black South African victim captured well the 
oppressiveness of this silence: ‘tolerance is preached everywhere to a point that talking about 
one’s experiences under the apartheid regime becomes a taboo’.  Some victims remain locked 
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in a victim identity. Sri Lanka’s peculiar ‘victor’s peace’ leaves particularly problematic 
experiences for many Tamil victims. As a social category, victims are also open to 
exploitation as political groups use victims’ embodiment of the conflict as a way to mobilise 
the competing moral frameworks through which the conflict is still partisanly understood.  
Despite all these vulnerabilities however, many victims are what Thomas (1999) calls 
moral beacons, showing exceptional displays of magnanimity (stressed by Gobodo-
Madikizela, 2008). In our samples, a very large number in all three societies displayed an 
extraordinary capacity for forgiveness, tolerance and civility, able to emotionally empathise 
with victims of other groups. It is for this reason that we appropriate Thomas’s description of 
victims as moral beacons, offering a light to how others more generally might respond in 
societies emerging out of conflict.  Some non-victims claim ownership of the hurt for their 
community without the imprimatur of the victims themselves and use this hurt in ways that 
politicise victimhood and encourage un-forgivingness and retribution.  
However, victims shed a stronger and more powerful light than that on the un-
forgivingness of many others in post-violent societies.  They point toward the meaning of 
humanitarianism in these kinds of society.   Victims with a survivor identity have a capacity 
to practice ethical virtues that are outworked in civility and tolerance and which constitutes, 
we argue, the social practice of humanitarianism. This makes humanitarianism a pro-social 
practice.  It encourages us to a view of humanitarianism that highlights how it contributes to 
the acquisition of new social consciousness, revised social understandings and the re-making 
of society after conflict.  We thus openly admit our moral standpoint, as Wilkinson and 
Kleinman (2016: 157) put it, that people are inherently social, or as Runciman described it 
(1999), are social animals, immersed and bounded by social life, with no potential for 
existence outside society. Even after experiencing the worst humanitarian abuses, most 
victims in our data are able to live a moral life as immanent social beings and are able to 
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confer humanity on their former enemies. To return to a point we made earlier, for our 
respondents at least a victim-centred social practice approach to humanitarianism reveals 
humanitarianism to be both a norm (capable of being practised) and normative (virtuous as an 
ideal).  
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